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Is the Christian Ethic Heteronomous?
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It has been popular of late to charge
Christian ethics with heteronomy. Many
modems tell us that since the norm for the
Christian life is the will of God, and since
to be a Christian means to be obedient to
divine commands which one receives
through an external revelation, then the
servitude that the Christian must have to
this outer authority denies autonomy on his
part, and makes him heteronomous. This
servitude to outer authority is mirrored,
they tell us further, in the Christian's em
phasis upon the necessity for faith.
In such a reading of Christianity there
is both truth and error. It is true that the
Christian ethos is grounded in a religious
premise. The basis of Christian ethics is
the will of God. The Christian, therefore,
is utterly different from that type of man
who wishes to free himself from all out
ward norms, create his own laws and
values, and have, as his only responsibil
ities, faithfulness to himself. The Christian
follows Christ in making the basis of his
ethics to be religious postulates. Without
faith in God, and without the assurance
that God is the ultimate meaning of the
universe rather than man, the Christian's
ethical ideal would be without support.
But does the fact that Christian morality
is theocentric logically imply that it is a
heteronomous ethic? Yes, if God is con
ceived in Neo-Reformation terms as
"Wholly Other." If God and man are
thought to be totally distinct from each
other in their essential natures, and the
will of God alone is the norm for man's
actions, then there can be no such thing
as autonomy on the part of man. Despite
the energetic attempt of the Neo-Reforma
tion theologians of our day to give men
some semblance of psychological auton
omy and freedom, the fact is that they
have left him with neither. Such has been
the result of their false disjunction of God
and man.
However, if one rejects this dualism as
a false assumption and accepts man's moral
capacities as a divine gift, rather than as
one's own creation, then God's will is not
something distinct (or even separate)
from, and alien to, human nature. God's
will then is not an outward command of
power which demands blind, unreflective
obedience apart from the coerciveness one
places on his own act. This is strongly
implied in the Christian doctrine of Cre
ation. Here man is said to have been made
in the image of God. Whatever effect the
"Fall" had on man, the coming of Christ
and the doctrine of the atonement insures
the "renewal" of the image, and the validity
of the above.
Even though it were true that man and
God were totally distinct from each other
in their essential natures, it still would not
carry through that man had no part in his
moral decisions. Whether the will of God
be objectively or subjectively communi
cated, it never has reached man with such
clarity that he is always certain of his
knowledge of the divine will, or sure of
that which he ought to do in the given
circumstances of life. There are no ex
ternal credentials accompanying the divine
will today which guarantee its divine ori
gin. Ultimately, its divine origin can only
be determined by an appeal to the "en
lightened conscience" of the Christian.
Our necessary uncertainty demands some
degree of autonomy on our part. Auton
omy is also demanded in the application of
moral laws to the everyday decisions of
practical life.
If it has been found that the Christian
ethos is not logically bound to be heteron
omous, can it be said that it is not so prac
tically? At this point it must be admitted
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that the charge of heteronomy applies to
many practicing Christians. Theirs is only
an external obedience, a mere acceptance
of external laws which can never be true
morality. An act is moral only when it is
freely willed by the one doing the acting.
True morality can never be based exclu
sively on the will of anyone else, even
though the other be God. Hence, as it per
tains to the actual motivation of many
"average" Christians, the charge of heter
onomy is both deserved and serious.
It is deserved because there are many-
too-many Christians who need to be stirred
out of their decadence, stodginess, com
placency, and inertia. That many Chris
tians are what Nietzsche called "herd-men"
cannot be denied. They are content to let
others think for them, decide for them,
and will do all possible to avoid conflict
and escape from living. They are the spir
itless, submissive, and the decadent. They
need to learn to judge for themselves and
reverence themselves more than they are
now doing.
It is a serious charge because such a
person can never become a moral person.
He violates the primary purpose behind the
free moral agency of man. The moral law
must be jg//-imposed and the moral act be
comes such only when it has one's own
approval. The Christian thinks of his
duties as divine commands, but not as com
mands which he does not accept on his
own behalf. Christian morahty, then,
should be found not in an external and im-
critically accepted divine will, but in one's
own inner moral nature as created of God,
and hence as subject to the divine will. The
comprehension of the minutiae of the di
vine requirements in the given concrete
moral situation demands continuous and
reverent attention to the principles of the
biblical ethic. This attention grows out of
the recognition and acceptance of both
present and ultimate responsibility to God.
From within these limits the valid Chris
tian moral autonomy emerges.
